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Abstract
Any water company is subject to regulation, either through bylaws, national or supra-national regulations. In
this contribution we assess how these regulatory regimes affect the discretion of privately owned companies in
England and Wales and publicly owned water companies in the Netherlands. The issue is studied by comparing the
discretion of such companies to pursue strategies of their choice. We look in particular at the constraints and the
opportunities posed by the regulatory regime on the provider’s discretion in dealing with clients, offering
products/services, setting tariffs, organizing themselves and establishing relationships with external actors. Our
research shows that the regulatory context invites water providers to differ in their strategies for markets, products
and tariff setting. The regulatory context seems not to be a determinant for their strategies with respect to their
internal and external organization. The findings of our research are particularly relevant for future research in
comparing publicly and privately owned producers. Hence, in future comparative research between companies
from different regulatory regimes, it is important to acknowledge the influence regulation may have on the actions
and performance of companies, next to demographical and hydrological features.
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Introduction
There is a lot at stake in the provision of drinking water. Water operators are subjected to regulation
since, apart from people’s primary concern about the quantity and quality of tapped water, the water
industry is riven with externalities (Jeffery, 1994; Glaister, 1996)1. As the stakes are high and the
distribution system is inevitably monopolistic, regulatory regimes are imposed to remedy the lack of
self-regulating market mechanisms (Carney, 1990; Robinson, 1997; Wills-Johnson et al., 2003).
The EU and individual EU countries impose regulatory regimes for water companies, resulting in
doi: 10.2166/wp.2009.079
1 They list, for example, environmental consequences, health effects, traffic disruption caused by water related construction, etc.
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restrictions to the provider’s discretion to pursue actions of their choice. The aim of this paper is to
research the regulatory impositions on public and private water companies in the Netherlands, England
and Wales and their impact on formulating and pursuing strategic actions. The sector specific and
regulatory constraints may hinder them in realizing the assumed benefits of private sector involvement
(Jeffery, 1990; Brown & Iverson, 2004). For example, in the UK just three years before the privatization
of the water companies, the White Paper on Water Privatization (HSMO, 1986) concluded:
“Private enterprise is both more flexible and readier to pursue energetic and innovative approaches
than the public sector. The demands of the market will give management and staff the impetus they need
to secure greater efficiency. Freeing the authorities from the constraints imposed by state ownership will
help them to carry out their tasks with vigour and imagination (para 38).”
The truth of such statements has been debated for a long time (van Dijk, 2004). The inability to find an
answer is largely due to the absence of clear convincing empirical evidence. Difficulties in standardizing
benchmarking indicators have hindered useful cross-company comparisons (Ogden, 1995; Robinson,
1997). Moreover, the unique character of the water sector prevents theories from other sectors from
being generalized (Bahaee, 1992; Ward et al., 1995).
One of the many changes that the private sector is assumed to bring about is that private parties select
their strategic actions differently. This is the change we want to address in this paper. The relevance of
strategic management to the water sector was confirmed by a survey among 248 water utilities (Sisson,
1992). Although he did not make a distinction between public and private companies, Sisson recognized
that water utilities that experienced higher levels of competition were more likely to have implemented a
formal strategic planning process (Figure 1).
The theoretical framework
An analysis of the regulatory constraints for water companies is an essential condition for studying the
strategies of water companies. Researchers have noted that different institutional circumstances may be
conducive to certain strategic actions (Desarbo et al., 2005). The concept of “strategic actions” is
interpreted by using a classification developed by Boyne & Walker (2004) which was tailored
specifically for public service organizations. They identify five strategic actions:
Fig. 1. Perceived levels of competition and formal strategic planning (Sisson, 1992).
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(1) Markets—which clients does the company want to serve? Although the primary scope of water
companies is severely constrained owing to the monopolistic character of the distribution network,
they are sometimes able to enter new markets or (partially) exit markets.
(2) Services—which products or services does the company want to offer? Water companies can provide
products or services other than water, or water of different qualities. Services could include affiliated
services like sewerage, but can extend to any service that the water companies might see as a
valuable endeavour.
(3) Price—what price does the company want to charge the clients for the service? A major part of
the strategy focus of any organization is ensuring that they have sufficient revenues to compensate
the costs.
These three strategic actions have a great similarity with the strategies of focus, differentiation
and cost leadership, defined by Porter (1980). Boyne & Walker (2004) propose to add two other
strategic actions because of the constraints that public organizations may face in altering the
selection of markets, services or prices. The strategic challenge for many managers in the public
realm is to find better ways to deliver existing services in a fixed market with limited revenues.
Therefore two additional types of strategic actions are:
(4) Internal organization—how to structure the internal organization? These strategic actions refer to
variables such as shaping the organizational structure, culture or style of leadership, the strategic
planning process and the adoption of performance measurement systems.
(5) External organization—how to interact with external parties? These arrangements may include
collaboration, networks, consortia or joint ventures, partnerships and outsourcing services to private
or non-profit parties.
Based upon this categorization the research framework is established (Table 1). We selected England
and Wales to represent the private companies and the Netherlands as representative sample of the public
water companies. Both countries are relatively homogenous and have comparable economic, social and
cultural conditions.
Applying the framework to the regulatory regimes
For each of the five identified strategic actions, an analysis is made of what extent regulatory bodies of
England and Wales and the Netherlands respectively constrain or provide opportunities for water
providers.
Table 1. Research framework strategic actions and ownership.
Private water companies (England and Wales) Public water companies (The Netherlands)
Regulatory regime on Regulatory opportunities Regulatory constraints Regulatory opportunities Regulatory constraints
Strategic actions
Market
Services
Revenues
Internal organization
External organization
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Strategic action 1: markets
Which clients does the company want to serve? We identified seven strategic market actions that a
water company can pursue, which will be dealt with in detail below. These are: market exit, bulk supply,
common carriage, inset appointments, unregulated supply, mergers and acquisitions within the country
and mergers and acquisitions outside of the country.
Market exit. England and Wales: There is no possibility of market exit for the water companies for, as
the water companies have been licensed in 1989 for a period of at least 25 years to be water undertakers
for specific geographical regions across England and Wales. However, they do not have exclusive rights
and they are not considered to be legalized monopolies (Nickson & Muscoe, 2004). The license of the
statutory undertaker can be terminated (condition O of the license agreement), although with a ten-year
notice period. The possibility for market exit is further reduced by the Water Industry Act of 1999 which
removed the companies’ power to disconnect customers for non-payment of charges. In 2003, over
4.4 million households are in arrears and 3 in 100 never pay at all, causing a bad debt to the water
companies of £130 million annually.
The Netherlands: The Dutch water companies, just like in England and Wales, have the obligation to
serve customers located within the assigned region. In the Netherlands this is based upon 30-year
concession contracts. In contrast to England and Wales, Dutch domestic consumers do not have the
possibility of selecting a water company of their choosing. They are “tied” to their water companies and
can be disconnected for non-payment, providing that the company by-laws allow it. According to data
provided by the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs (Brinkhorst, 2005) approximately 2,000 of the
7.3 million connections (0.03%) is temporarily disconnected. These disconnections, in general, last no
longer than several days, and before being disconnected a collection procedure of almost a full year is
followed. Within this period, defaulters are reminded several times, both in writing as by phone, before a
debt-collection agency is called in.
Bulk supply. England and Wales: In bulk supply, one water company sells an amount of water to a
neighbouring company. Bulk supply is widely practiced in the British water industry (Booker, 1994). As
an inter-company trade, these arrangements are negotiated between the two companies themselves and
regulation does not interfere, provided that the water resources are not negatively affected and the
customers are not negatively implicated. Only in case of dispute between the two companies the
regulator (OFWAT) can intervene and determine the tariff for bulk water (Jeffery, 1990).
The Netherlands: The Dutch water companies also sell bulk-water to each other. This is done through
inter-company arrangements that are not regulated.
Common carriage. England and Wales: Common carriage, when one company supplies water or
sewerage services to its customers by using another company’s network, may include the shared use of a
pipe network, treatment works or storage capacity. Common carriage is based on the insistence of
OFWAT that operators should grant access to their facilities under certain terms. The guiding principle
in England and Wales is that each individual customer is entitled to receive water for domestic purposes
from any water company, irrespective of where they live. Although common carriage is conceptually
and theoretically interesting, in practice such sharing of facilities runs into severe quality and hygienic
complications and has not occurred yet. It is estimated that the potential future market for common
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carriage is to be around £250 million, relatively small compared to the regulated revenues of over
£7 billion of the existing water companies (Nickson & Muscoe, 2004). Still, if water companies refuse
entrants access to their facilities without an objective justification or on unreasonable terms, they risk
infringement of the Competition Act of 1998.
The Netherlands: Dutch domestic customers do not have the right to receive water services from a
water company of their choosing. They are restricted to using their current monopoly service provider;
hence there is no possibility for common carriage arrangements.
Inset appointments. England and Wales: Another possibility for a water company to enter the market
of another English or Welsh water company is by using the mechanism of inset appointments, as allowed
and promoted by the regulator OFWAT based on the Competition and Services (Utilities) Act of 1992.
In this case an interested water company could apply to OFWAT to serve (groups of) clients that lie
within another operators’ supply area without using the infrastructure of the incumbent operator. These
inset appointments are limited to large clients that use more than 100 megalitres (Ml) of water per year or
to sites that are not yet served (green fields). Although the possibility for water companies to make use of
inset appointments has been available for almost more than 10 years, it has been relatively unsuccessful.
Only nine insets have been approved to date (Nickson & Muscoe, 2004).
The Netherlands: Dutch water companies are allowed to use a mechanism similar to inset
appointments. They can compete for so-called “footloose” customers, who are large-scale customers
who use water as a means of production. In 2000 the Dutch cabinet instated the Water Supply Act to
protect public drinking water companies in the short run, by forbidding privatization as far as “tied”
customers are concerned, these being households and small industries. But the Water Supply Act opens
the market for all other uses, in other words the “footloose” customers. Just like in England and Wales,
companies that consume more than 100 Ml of water per year are allowed to choose from which company
they buy their water (Kuks, 2001).
Unregulated supply. England and Wales: Another possibility for a water company to obtain a new
customer in England and Wales is by starting to supply one of the 300,000 customers that currently rely
on unregulated supply. Unregulated supply refers to the 50,000 private very small water providers that
supply water for domestic purposes to this group. Most of these providers (75%) are single dwellings
(Memon & Butler, 2003).
The Netherlands: The number of potential customers relying on unregulated supply is far less in the
Netherlands compared to the UK, as the vast majority of consumers are already connected. However,
water companies can connect those that are not already connected by another water company. Just like
the large consumers discussed under inset appointments, these unregulated users are considered to be
“footloose customers”.
Mergers and acquisitions within the country. England and Wales: In theory, each of the 24 water
companies can be bought and sold like any other company (Nickson & Muscoe, 2004), including the
possibility for hostile takeovers. Proposals for change of ownership have to be referred to OFWAT as the
Competition and Services Act clearly states provisions for replacing an appointed undertaker. A recent
ruling of the court in the case of Welsh Water insisted that a change of ownership of an established water
company should go by a system of competitive bids (Pielen et al., 2004). OFWAT is not supportive
towards more mergers, as a further reduction in the number of companies affects its ability to make
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comparisons between companies (Carney, 1990; Byatt, 1993). The Water Industry Act of 1991 requires
that the Competition Commission be asked for approval if the gross assets of each of the water
companies to be merged exceed an amount of 44 million euros. The Competition Act of 1998 outlaws
any agreement that (may) have a damaging effect on competition. The Act prohibits agreements between
water companies that intend or actively prevent, restrict or distort competition and also forbids conduct
that amounts to the abuse of a dominant position in a market that may affect competition. Hostile
takeovers may be allowed. For example, the French company Lyonnaise des Eaux launched a hostile
takeover of the licensed operator Northumbrian, which was allowed by the Competition Commission.
Examples of less successful hostile takeovers are from Severn Trent and Wessex Water, both requesting
the Competition Commission to takeover South West Water. Both their bids were blocked on the
grounds of the loss of information for the regulator and its ability to undertake comparative competition.
European restrictions on merging are in place in case the combined aggregate turnover of all the
undertakings concerned is more than 5 billion euros.
The Netherlands: The Dutch water companies have the ability to merge with or acquire other Dutch
water companies, often even promoted by the regulatory bodies. The Dutch water companies have made
extensive use of this strategic action. In 1980 there were about 100 companies, of which currently just 16
are left (VEWIN, 2003). Supervisory bodies regarded the mergers favourably as they considered a
minimum size requirement of 100,000 connections for supply companies to achieve economies of scale
(Kuks, 2001). Regulation permits hostile takeovers in the Netherlands. However, few examples are
known. In 2000, Nuon Water attempted a hostile takeover of the Waterbedrijf Gelderland, but it never
materialized. In 2006, the water provider Evides threatened to approach the shareholders of the
neighboring water provider Hydron-Zuid Holland during negotiations for a merger. The management of
Hydron Zuid-Holland felt pressurized and warned its shareholders. Subsequently both parties became
highly demotivated to merge and is for the time being put on hold.
Mergers and acquisitions outside of the country. England and Wales: With certain exceptions, the
regulatory provisions do not apply to business activities of the water companies that are not connected
with carrying out their water services in the assigned service area (Jeffery, 1990). To protect the water
customers in the assigned monopoly area from losses which could be incurred by other companies within
the group, the regulator OFWAT ensures that there is no cross-subsidy between the water provider and
associated companies (Byatt, 1993). Consequently, the basic organization of each company (Carney,
1990) is shaped as in illustrated in Figure 2.
In practice, the licensed water company is often part of a relatively complicated institutional
environment. For example, Anglian Water has received a license to provide water services to East
Anglia and the East Midlands. For this activity it makes an annual turnover of approximate £900 million
with 3,600 employees. The parent company of Anglian Water is the Anglian Water Group (AWG),
which also includes the support services group Morrison plc and AWG Property. AWG has 9,000 staff
based in offices across the UK. The group’s turnover was £1.5 billion. Again to complicate the corporate
structure further, AWG is owned by a private consortium Osprey, comprising the Canada Pension Plan
Investment Board, Colonial First State Global Asset Management, Industry Funds Management and 3i
Group plc.
The Netherlands: The regulatory environment in the Netherlands discourages water companies from
engaging in adventures outside the Netherlands. Company by-laws often do not permit operators to
expand their activities beyond the service area. They use the argument that the revenues received from
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the local Dutch customers should only be used for these local Dutch customers and should and not be
spent on possibly risky business opportunities outside of the country (Blokland et al., 1999).
Strategic action 2: services
Which products or services does the company wants to offer? This strategic action concerns the
imposition of regulatory regimes on the core business and on non-core activities for the client group that
is already served.
Core-business of water. England and Wales: According to the Water Industry Act of 1991, water
companies cannot escape their statutory duty to deliver “wholesome” water to their assigned monopoly
area. “Wholesome” is defined by reference to microbiological and chemical standards and other
requirements set out in the Water Supply Regulations of 1989 and 2000. Section 70 of the Water
Industry Act specifically makes it a criminal offence for a water company to supply water that is
unsuitable for human consumption.
If a water operator tries to escape their statutory duties, the economic regulator OFWAT has the
ability to issue an enforcement order. If a company does not comply with the order, OFWAT can ask the
High Court to appoint a special administrator to run the company until arrangements can be made for a
new company to take over.
The Netherlands: Just like the English and Welsh companies, the Dutch water companies must
provide “wholesome” water. The Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment supervises the
quality of the drinking water produced. Recently the inspections have been replaced by trust,
complemented by incidental inspection (van Dijk et al., 2004).
Non-core activities. England and Wales: Many water companies have diversified into non-water
activities. Just like adventures abroad, these non-core activities are excluded from the regulatory regimes
and cross-subsidization is prohibited. In view of the popularity of diversifying, regulators are facing a
dilemma since diversification of services has meant that companies are increasingly using their core
skills and management time on diversification activities. This cannot always be expressed in a price and
cross subsidization mechanism (Booker, 1994).
Fig. 2. Basic organization of each water company in England and Wales.
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The Netherlands: The strategic choice to supply non-water services is constrained by regulatory
impositions. Dutch regulators are pursuing a policy of bringing all the activities of public sector
organizations that may find themselves competing with market players or market activities into legally,
financially and organizationally independent units. This means that there is little choice for traditional
water companies to transfer their activities other than water supply to a separate company. By dividing
their assets in this way, they can prevent the business risks associated with their commercial activities
being passed on to their tied customers (Kuks, 2001). Company by-laws also often do not permit
operators to expand their activities beyond the core business of water (Blokland et al., 1999). On the
other hand, the Dutch government has adopted as official policy the pursuit of cooperation between
water managers, municipalities and drinking water companies with a view to making use of
environmental opportunities and increasing efficiency (V&W, 1998). Experiments are being launched
with water chain companies set up to bring together the expertise needed to serve industrial companies
and are geared to managing the complete company chain. However, they do not have a multi-utility
character (Kuks, 2001).
Strategic action 3: what price does the company want to charge clients?
England and Wales: The economic regulator OFWAT strictly regulates the price setting of drinking
water since the Competition and Service Act was passed in 1992. OFWAT sets the allowable price (also
known as the K-factor) based upon the so-called price-cap mechanism that the companies are obliged to
follow. K is calculated every five years, taking into account general retail price inflation as well as results
from the yardstick competition that OFWAT is conducting. Since K is applied to a basket of regulated
charges, covering both measured and unmeasured water and sewerage charges, as well as trade effluent
charges; each company still has the ability to increase or decrease average charges for individual
“basket items”.
The Netherlands: In the Netherlands the tariff is set by the company itself. Water utility management
prepares an annual proposal for tariff height and structure for approval of the company shareholders
based on the notion of cost recovery. Municipal and provincial governments, as owners of the water
providers, have the power to agree with or reject the proposed tariff system. National government does
not interfere in matters of water pricing. Hence, the only regulation enforced upon the tariff is the control
of the shareholders to which the tariff needs to be proposed, although even that depends on the company
by-laws. Since these shareholders are public entities such as municipalities or provinces, the Dutch
regulatory system assumes this is sufficient to maintain a level of equity and affordability.
Strategic action 4: internal organization
How should the internal organization be structured? This strategic action focuses on internal
organizational arrangements for service provision.
England and Wales: The English and Welsh companies have complete management control, although
they need to consider specific regulatory provisions like, for example, the Guaranteed Standard Scheme
(GSS), which contains information on customers’ rights (including compensation for supply
interruptions). Yardstick competition is not only useful in respect of determining the price cap but is
also intended to work as a motivation to improve performance. Participation in the yardstick comparison
is compulsory (Robinson, 1997).
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The Netherlands: Just like the English and Welsh water companies, Dutch public limited companies
have complete managerial autonomy, although the company by-laws limit the manager in their freedom
of operation. In the organization of the drinking water supply service, most Dutch drinking water
companies have embraced a system of voluntary benchmarking since 1997, looking at four aspects:
drinking water supply, cost efficiency, environmental performance and service performance. The
objective of this benchmark is to increase the transparency of the drinking water companies’
performance and to provide an instrument that can improve efficiency.
Strategic action 5: external organization
How should the organization interact with external parties? External organization refers to the inter-
organizational relationships through which many organizations provide services. A distinction can be
made between:
(1) the relation with the “supplier” of raw water;
(2) the relation with the suppliers of subcontracts and other materials.
The relation with the “supplier” of raw water. England and Wales: The Environmental Agency,
mandated by the Environmental Act of 1995, continuously monitors the amount of environmental
pollution generated by the water companies, including their effect on water resources caused by
abstraction. To abstract water, companies need to apply for a time limited abstraction licence issued by
the Environmental Agency. In case a licensed abstraction causes damage or loss to anyone, the person
has the right to seek financial compensation from the abstractor. Moreover, water companies are obliged
to submit water resource plans each year to the Environment Agency.
The Netherlands: The water company is dependent on receiving a license to extract groundwater. The
Province issues these licenses. Moreover water companies need to pay an abstraction charge of about 34
cents per cubic metre. As the regulatory bodies want to discourage the use of groundwater, there is a
rebate of 28.5 per cubic metre in case surface water is injected into the groundwater prior to injection
(van Dijk et al., 2004).
The relation with the suppliers of subcontracts and other materials. England and Wales: To engage
external parties, the Utility Contract Regulations, dating from 1996, regulate procurement in the water
sector and other utility industries. On the basis of this regulation, OFWAT monitors companies’ use of
associates for subcontracting.
The Netherlands: Just like in England and Wales, Dutch water companies have to comply with
procurement rules for tendering and bidding as formulated by the European Commission.
Conclusion
A different institutional context is conducive to formulating different strategies. The research provides
a first step in answering the question of what extent privately owned water companies have a different
strategy compared to publicly owned water companies. An answer to this question is highly relevant as
there is no clear convincing empirical evidence in the water industry that private sector involvement is
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Table 2. Complete research framework, strategic actions and ownership.
Private water companies (England and Wales) Public water companies (The Netherlands)
Regulatory regime on Regulatory opportunities Regulatory constraints Regulatory opportunities Regulatory constraints
Strategic actions
Market No exclusive rights given to
incumbents;
To use bulk supply, common
carriage & inset appointments;
Transfer of ownership;
Activities outside
England & Wales
Bound to assigned population;
Cannot disconnect customers;
No mergers inside
England & Wales
To use bulk supply;
To benefit from inset
appointments;
Mergers inside the
Netherlands allowed
Bound to assigned population;
Exclusive rights of incumbents;
No change ownership;
Activities outside the
Netherlands not encouraged
Services Differentiation Bound to supply wholesome
water;
No cross-subsidization
allowed
Bound to supply wholesome
water;
Separate other from water
activities;
Often restricted by by-laws
Revenues Appeal to tariff setting
by OFWAT;
Indirect influence through
negotiations and participating
in yardstick
Price cap regime;
Limitations to compulsory
metering
Company sets itself the
tariff individually;
No limits to compulsory
metering
Approval of shareholders
Internal organization Each company has complete
management control
Acknowledge customer
rights;
Compulsory yardstick
participation
Each company has
complete management
control;
Voluntary benchmarking
External organization Abstraction licenses;
Submit water resource plans;
Procurement rules for tendering
Abstraction licenses;
Procurement rules for tendering
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beneficial. The empirical answer to this question is difficult to produce by comparing companies in the
water sector. Conditions may vary and influence the results, as we have learned from benchmarking
(VEWIN, 2003).
From the analysis we conclude that, at least conceptually, the regulatory regimes in the two countries
differ. In England and Wales, all customers are legally entitled to receive water from any water
company, irrespective of where they are located, although this is difficult to carry out in practice. The
Dutch approach is more restrictive. They classify customers into “tied” and “footloose” customers,
whereby only the footloose customers have such an entitlement. Consequently, the English and Welsh
regulatory context allows water companies to chase customers while such possibilities are more limited
in the Netherlands. This may again be the reason why the regulator in England and Wales strongly
constrains the possibilities for a water company to merge within another English or Welsh water
company, intending to preserve both the possibility for competition in the market and comparative
competition. On the other hand, the regulator is lenient for English and Welsh companies if the
ownership goes from one private owner to another, or even if the water company starts to buy or
merge with water companies outside of England and Wales. In the Dutch case it seems to be just
the other way around. The government has actively promoted mergers within the Netherlands during
the last few decades, but shifts in ownership are tightly regulated. The Dutch water companies
are very much discouraged, or even prevented from merging with or being taken over by a
foreign company.
The same conservative attitude of the Dutch regulatory regime is applicable to the provision of non-
water services. Often the company by-laws prevent such undertakings. The English and Welsh regulator
stays out of the diversification decision, although the regulator prohibits any cross-subsidization from its
water business. In short, mergers and acquisitions in the Netherlands are limited to mergers between
Dutch publicly owned water companies, while in England and Wales water companies are not allowed to
merge, except with foreign companies.
The greater discretion English and Welsh water companies enjoy with respect to market and product
strategies, may be a consequence of their smaller discretion with respect to tariff setting. Tariffs are
strictly regulated in England and Wales, while in the Netherlands tariff setting is left largely to the
discretion of company management.
In sum, the overall conclusion is that regulatory contexts in England and Wales and the Netherlands
invite of water companies to take strategic actions in different directions. Future research should take
this into account in explaining possible differences between managerial conduct and performance.
In Table 2 all the regulatory constraints and opportunities for the five strategic actions are summarized
and compared.
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